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Abstract
This paper investigates the e¤ect of potential competition on takeovers
which we model as a bargaining game with alternating o¤ers where calling
an auction represents an outside option for each bidder at each stage of
the game. The model aims to answer three main questions: who wins the
takeover? when? and how?
Our results are able to explain why the takeover premium resulting
from a negotiated deal is not signicantly di¤erent from that resulting
from an auction, and why tender o¤ers are rarely observed in reality.
Furthermore, the model allows us to draw conclusions on how other
dimensions of the takeover process, such as termination fees, target resis-
tance and tender o¤er costs, a¤ect its dynamics and outcome.
Keywords: takeover negotiations, auctions, bargaining, outside option.
JEL Classication: G34, C78.
1 Introduction
Since the seminal paper of Manne (1965) changes in corporate control have been
considered a key mechanism in corporate governance. Potential challenges to
control discipline the incumbent management only to the extent that e¢ciency-
improving raiders compete for control of rms with weak internal governance. A
vast empirical literature tries to assess whether this theory is at work in reality
reaching controversial conclusions. For example, Moeller et al. (2007) nd that
less than four percent of deals are subject to public competition and Betton
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et al. (2008) report that 95 percent of the takeover bids considered in their
sample are single-bid contests. On the other hand, Aktas et al. (2010) provide
compelling evidence of strong latent competition during the private takeover
process and show that more potential bidders are associated with higher takeover
bids.1 These latter empirical results suggest that in order to capture the role
of potential competition in takeover processes, it is more appropriate to model
takeover negotiations as proper contests where any initial bids may attract
competition from rival bidders (Betton and Eckbo, 2008).2
Building on these observations, our paper aims to investigate the e¤ect of
potential competition on the negotiation dynamics as well as on the outcomes of
takeover contests. We analyze takeovers initiated by acquiring companies with
unsolicited o¤ers and we model the takeover negotiation as a bargaining game
where both parties have access to an outside option at each stage: namely, the
possibility to call a private auction (for the target) or a tender o¤er (for the
raider).
The purpose of our analysis is to answer three key questions. Who wins
the takeover? We characterize under which condition the initial bidder is able
to secure the deal rather than losing it to a competitor. When? We study
the duration of the takeover process. And nally, How? We investigate the
mode of completion, i.e. whether the takeover ends with agreed deal or with
auction. Our model also allows us to draw conclusions on the size of the takeover
premium in negotiated deals and in auctions as well as to assess the impact of
other features of the takeover contest - termination fees, maximum length of
the negotiation, information costs to enter an auction and tender-o¤er costs -
on the contest dynamics and its outcome.
To address our research questions, we build a bargaining model of alternating
o¤ers over a nite horizon that is an adaptation of the Rubinstein-Stähl game
over an innite horizon (see Rubinstein, 1982; Shaked 1994; Sloof, 2004).
The bargaining process develops as follows. A raider starts the negotiations
by making an unsolicited o¤er for the target.3 The incumbent, who controls the
target rm and enjoys private benets of control that would be lost if the raider
succeeds, has three possible strategies to respond to the raiders o¤er: he can
accept the o¤er in which case the deal is agreed upon and the game ends; he can
opt-out and call for a private auction; or he can reject the o¤er but continue the
negotiations making a counter o¤er to the raider. In this latter case, the raider
can choose among the same strategies with the only di¤erence that opting out
implies that the raider makes a tender o¤er, as announced sometimes in a "bear
1 In the recent Kraft-Cadbury takeover for instance, Kraft nally raised its bid when a
countero¤er by Hershey became likely, although in the end this o¤er did not materialize. In
another high prole case, the takeover of EMI by the private equity company Terra Firma,
Terra Firma was induced to raise its bid for fear of facing an auction although no competing
o¤er was ever made.
2"Perhaps the most straightforward way to advance our understanding of aggregate merger
activity is to model the takeover process from basic, microeconomic principles", Betton and
Eckbo (2008, p. 403).
3Aktas et al. (2011) provide evidence that in their sample only 19 percent of negotiated
deals are intiated by the target.
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hug letter" (Betton and Eckbo, 2008; Boone and Mulherin, 2009). Conversely, if
the raider stays in the negotiation, the process continues to the next round where
the incumbent moves rst making an o¤er to the raider. In this new round the
players strategies are the same as in the previous one only with reversed roles.
The parties can keep negotiation until a nite deadline is reached. Thus, in
our model both parties can opt-out from the negotiation at each stage exerting
their respective outside options, a private auction or a tender o¤er. We model
these outside options as multi-stage auctions where competing bidders have to
pay an information cost to learn their synergy with the target and then decide
whether to enter the auction or not. Hence, the key feature of the model which
innovates relative to the existing literature is that auctions and negotiations are
interrelated and not mutually exclusive.
Our analysis generates numerous interesting results. Firstly, our model is
able to explain why observed takeover premia in negotiated deals and private
auctions are not statistically di¤erent. This is consistent with the empirical
evidence documented by Boone and Mulherin (2007). This arises from the fact
that the premium in negotiated deals incorporates the payo¤ from going to
an auction. We also show that the takeover premium increases with potential
competition but it decreases with the information cost potential competing bid-
ders have to pay to enter the auction. Also, our model allows us to disentagle
the e¤ects of target resistance from the e¤ects of potential competition on the
takeover outcome. We nd that the takeover premium is not a¤ected by the
level of target resistance, proxied by the benets of control for the incumbent,
whenever the raider chooses pre-emptive bidding in order to deter the entry of
competing bidders (in line with Fishman, 1988). Otherwise, if the entry of po-
tential competitors is not pre-empted, high control benets increase the takeover
premium as in the target resistance theory (Bebchuk ,1994). Our results di¤er
from Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010), who also investigate the impact of pre-
emptive bidding relative to that of target resistance, as we nd that potential
competition is the key driver of takeover premia whereas target resistance plays
a role only for relatively weak bidders.
Furthermore, our results suggest that most deals are negotiated and are con-
cluded at the rst round of negotiation. The two parties anticipate the value of
their credible threats in the negotiation and, whenever possible, reach an agree-
ment as soon as possible. This feature of our model is consistent with existing
empirical evidence by Betton and Eckbo (2008) showing that the median dura-
tion of contests when rms are private is zero days; it is also consistent with the
observation of few public auctions.4 With regard to the mode of completion, we
nd that, in equilibrium, tender o¤ers are never observed.
Finally, we also analyze the e¤ect of termination fees, amongst other things,
on the takeover outcome and nd that su¢ciently low termination fees do not
impair competition suggesting that the recent decision of the Takeover Panel to
ban termination fees might not be in the interest of target companies contrary
4Similarly, Aktas and de Bodt (2010) and Moeller et al. (2007) report that less than 4%
of deals are subject to observable public competition.
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to their expectations.
The e¤ect of competition on takeover dynamics is relevant from a regulatory
point of view as it is at the heart of the new European Take-over Directive
2004/25/EG. The stated objective of the Directive is to create a "free and open
market for corporate control [and] a level playing eld where market forces will
determine the outcome of a takeover contest" (Ferrarini and Miller, 2009). In
order to achieve this objective, the rules set by the directive require the target
board to search for alternative and competing bids but also to remain passive
and not to engage in any defensive strategies during the takeover contest.5
Similarly, the recent amendments to the Takeover Code in the UK aim to enable
the target of a takeover bid to create enough competition in order to maximize
shareholder value (The Takeover Panel Code Committee (2011)).
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section re-
views the related literature on mergers and acquisitions as well as on bargaining
games. Section 3 details the model. The main results are reported in Section
4. In Section 5 we provide a discussion of the results and their main empirical
predictions. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 Literature review
Our paper contributes to the literature on takeover contests and to the bargain-
ing literature which are reviewed below.
2.1 Takeover Literature
The idea of modeling merger negotiations as processes that embed an auction
is not entirely new to the takeover literature. To the best of our knowledge,
however, most of the papers compare auctions with one-to-one negotiations for
the purpose of identifying the most e¢cient sale mechanism.
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) do compare auctions with negotiations but
the two takeover mechanisms are considered to be mutually exclusive. In their
model, bidders, who enter the game sequentially and have to learn their syn-
ergies with the target, choose between negotiating the deal with the target or
calling a tender o¤er at the beginning of the process. Thus, auctions do not
represent an outside option in the bargaining process as in our paper and the
bidders cannot switch from negotiations to auctions during the process. In this
context, Berkovitch and Khanna (1991) nd that bidders who discover to have
5This is implemented by the board neutrality principle during takeover contests and the
use of so called breakthrough rules. The use of breakthrough rules aims at invalidating a
variety of defensive tactics such as poison pills, dual-class shares structure, limitations on
voting rights that can result in the frustration of the takeover bid. Our model is consistent
with this regulation because we exclude any defensive tactics except the quest of competitive
bidders.
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low synergies with the target never choose tender o¤ers because the potential
competition is too strong.
Bulow and Klemperer (2009) also develop a model where a seller can chooses
between two mutually exclusive sale mechanisms, an auction or a sequential sale.
They model the auction as a standard English auction whereas the sequential
sale mechanism is such that each bidder can choose whether to enter or not,
and if so the bid to make (similarly to our multi-stage auction). They show
that ascending auctions are more protable than sequential sales because they
encourage more bidders to enter. The result is driven by the fact that in a
sequential sale bidders can use pre-emptive bidding to prevent the entry of
other bidders. The optimality of pre-emptive bidding in a sequential auction
was rst shown by Fishman (1988,1989). He proved that bidders with high
private valuations of the target can optimally decide to o¤er a high premium at
their very rst bid in order to signal their high valuation to potential bidders,
and henceforth discourage their entry. 6 [remove footnote]
Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010) extend Fishmans model with the purpose
of disentangling the e¤ects of preemptive bidding and target resistance on the
takeover premia. In their model, target resistance is modeled as an exogenous
minimum o¤er set by target shareholders. This reservation price is learned by
the winning bidder only at the end of the bidding process and, at that point,
if the winning bid is below the minimum bid the bidder has the possibility to
raise the o¤er. In their empirical test, Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010) provide
evidence that the high premia observed in single bidder contests result from
the need to overcome target resistance rather than potential competition.Our
model di¤ers from Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010) in that we endogenize this
minimum acceptable o¤er, which, in each stage of the negotiation, equals the
value of the target shareholders best credible threat. As a consequence we
obtain di¤erent predictions about the impact of potential competition relative
to target resistance on takeover premia.
Povel and Singh (2006) also study the optimal mechanism for selling a rm.
In their model, bidders are not equally informed about the target value. This
implies that bidders with a less precise estimate of the target value are more
concerned about about the winners curse and thus bid less. In this context, the
authors show that a sequential procedure in which the seller starts communicat-
ing exclusively with the best informed bidder is optimal. The results rely on
the commitment of the two parties whereas in our model there is no
Contrary to Povel and Singh (2006), in our model the target can call
for an auction at any stage of the negotiation with the raider: our so-
lution then does not rely on strong commitments by the negotiating
parties not to deviate from the rules of the sequential procedure, as
for example the threat to exclude the rst bidder from the procedure
if he does not o¤er at least a minimum bid at the beginning of the
second stage.7 [ Ricc non mi piace riscriviamo ma non so esattamente cosa
6See for example Hirshleifer and Png (1989), Cremer, Spiegel and Zheng (2007) among
others.
7The commitment requirements behind the solution of Povel and Singh (2006) are discussed
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vuoi. non mi sembra molto legato a noi sto paper]
A di¤erent strand of the takeover literature has more recently devoted a
lot of attention to the private process that takes place prior to the public an-
nouncement of a bid which can help explaining the characteristics of corporate
takeovers. In their seminal paper, Boone and Mulherin (2009) suggest that a
takeover process may involve up to eleven steps and entails substantial compe-
tition, even though auctions with many bidders are rarely observed in reality.
Builiding on these observations, Betton et al. (2008), (2009) and Aktas et al.
(2010) suggest that takeover negotiations should be assumed to be conducted
"under the shadow of auctions" (Eckbo, 2009).
Betton et al. (2009) develop a model of merger negotiations followed by an
open auction where the initial bidder competes against a single competitor. This
framework is then used to investigate the initial bidders optimal toehold strat-
egy. The main di¤erence with respect to our paper is that in Betton et al. (2009)
merger negotiations always end up in an auction whereas we model auctions as
an outside option for both the raider and the target, hence they represent only
one possible outcome of the takeover process. Aktas et al. (2010) instead con-
struct an empirical measure of the degree of potential competition based on
the idea that merger negotiations explicitly take place "under the shadow of an
auction". They show that the credible threat of an auction during negotiations
may explain why the bid premia in negotiated deals are statistically identical
to those in auctions, a result rst pointed out by Boone and Mulherin (2007).
Aktas and de Bodt (2010) also look at the market reaction to mergers announce-
ments and nd that target stock prices react in the same way to auctions and
to negotiations as documented also by Boone and Mulherin (2007). Consistent
with these ndings, our results also show that the bid premium agreed in the
negotiation anticipates the expected outcome of a potential auction. This in
turn implies that high initial premia may be due to the fact that the raider
anticipates high potential competition rather than to pre-emptive bidding.
Finally, although it is not the main focus of the analysis, our paper also
draws some conclusions on the role of termination fees. Several papers have
investigated the e¤ect of termination provisions, such as inducement fees, in
takeovers but reach di¤erent conclusions. Coates and Subramanian (2000) and
Bates and Lemmon (2003) nd that termination fees adversely a¤ect competi-
tion and ultimately prevent allocative e¢ciency. O¢cer (2003), however, claims
that the apparent negative impact of termination provisions on competition is
in fact due to other deal characteristics. More recently, Boone and Mulherin
(2007) show that termination provisions, i.e. fees and stock option agreements,
increase takeover competition in the sense that they e¤ectively compensate a
bidder in the event that the target is ultimately acquired by a competitor. Our
results are in line with that of Boone and Mulherin and suggest that the e¤ect
of termination fees depends on their size.
in their Section 3.
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2.2 Bargaining Literature
Our model develops an extension of the traditional Rubinstein bargaining game
with alternating o¤ers. A specic feature of this game is that it always generates
an e¢cient equilibrium with no delay, that is where parties nd an agreement
immediately. Much of the subsequent bargaining literature has tried to modify
the basic Rubinstein game in order to account for more realistic features of
bargaining procedures such as rejected o¤ers, agreements near the deadline or
no-agreement outcomes. In a seminal paper, Ma and Manove (1993) extend
the standard Rubinstein bargaining game by introducing uncertainty about the
players strategies. Specically, they assume that (a). players can strategically
delay their o¤ers without losing their turn; and (b) each o¤er is transmitted to
the other player with a random delay. In this context, their model generates,
like ours, equilibria where the agreement is reached at the end of the game.
However, in our model the source of uncertainty that leads the result concerns
the possible entry of a stronger competitor after the rst bid is made. This in
turn implies that, while in Ma and Manove (1993) both parties are better o¤
delaying the agreement to a later stage, in our model only the target [raider??]
has an incentive to delay the agreement beyond the rst stage.
In the same spirit, Perry and Reny (1993) develop a modication of the
Rubinstein alternating o¤er game by imposing the following two restrictions
on the players strategies: (a) each player has to wait a positive amount of
time, a "waiting time", before being able to submit a new o¤er; and (b) each
player can respond to his opponent only after a given (non negative) amount
of time called the "reaction time". The model then generates equilibria with
delay whereas the traditional no delay equilibrium arises when the reaction
time is equal to zero. Moreover, Perry and Reny (1993) also show under which
conditions the equilibria obtained in continuous time bargaining models have the
same characteristics of the equilibria in discrete-time frameworks.[LEVIAMO
QUESTA PARTE??]
Our paper di¤ers from the previous ones because the uncertainty in our
bargaining game stems from probability of facing a stronger competitor during
the negotiation which, in turn, implies that the value of the outside option is
endogenously determined and changes over time. Similarly to the papers above,
our model yields a wider set of possible equilibria which include equilibria where
the agreement is reached at the end of the game as well as equilibria with no
agreement.
Finally, our model builds on Sloof (2004) who models a bargaining game with
a nite horizon and alternating o¤ers where both agents have outside options.
Our model extends and enriches Sloofs one in that the value of the outside
option changes over time because it depends on the entry of a second bidder
which is uncertain. As a result, while in nite-time bargaining games as in
Sloof (2004) the players value of staying in the negotiation decreases as players
approach the nal date, in our model, the raiders value of staying in the game
actually increases as time goes by because he faces less potential competition.
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3 The model
An incumbent I (he hereafter) owns a controlling stake  > 0 in the target
rm. I can be thought of as a large blockholder or the target management.
We assume that I conducts the takeover negotiations for the target throughout
the process. We assume that the block  provides its owner with control of the
target rm, which entitles the incumbent to non-transferrable private benets
P > 0. Small, dispersed shareholders own the remaining 1    shares in the
target company.8
At t = 1 a second rm R; the raider (she hereafter), makes an unsolicited
bid to I for the acquisition of the company. Note that contrary to Boone and
Mulherin (2007) our model focuses on takeovers that start with an unsolicited
- potentially hostile - o¤er and can turn into a private sale or a tender o¤er at
later stages. This enables us to account not only for competition among bidders
but also for di¤erent attitudes of the bidders towards the target, i.e. hostile
vs friendly. Further, the unsolicited bid implies that if the raider takes over
the target, I will lose his private benet P: Because we do not want to focus
on the strategic decision by R about the optimal stake to buy in the target,
any o¤er by R is considered to hold for 100% of the target shares. The o¤er is
privately negotiated with I and publicly announced and submitted to all other
shareholders once an agreement is reached (see for example Hansen (2001)). We
assume that whenever I tenders its stake to R at a certain price, all minority
shareholders do the same. Conversely, if I does not sell to R, the minority
shareholders cannot sell at the same conditions o¤ered to I (simply because
they have not received the o¤er yet). Notice however that our results hold also
if R bids only for the block , provided that she buys it from I and not from
the minority shareholders.9
At time t = 1 all rms values are normalized to zero. The (per share) value
of the target rm for R is equal to r 2]0; 1] which represents the present value of
the additional cash ows generated by the merger. We assume that the synergy
r is only known to R,10 while it becomes known to both R and I at the beginning
of their negotiation.11 In the following, all payo¤s are expressed on a per-share
basis. Finally, we assume that bids are paid with internal cash, the target is
all-equity nanced and players are all risk-neutral prot-maximizers.
8As Shleifer and Vishny (1986) point out, while a large shareholder has incentives to
monitor the rm closely because he internalizes a large part of the benets generated, he will
not internalize all of them, but, on the other hand, pays all the costs. This gives room for
external raiders takeovers.
9 In the case that R buys the block , our model would describe a controlled sale associated
with a change in the control of the target.
10 In other words, we assume that the common value part of the synergies that might be cre-
ated acquiring the target rm is normalized to zero and commonly known across all potential
bidders participating in the takeover (see also Eckbo (2009)).
11While conceding that this assumption can be strong, we believe that in reality the nego-
tiation over a price during a takeover normally starts only after an accurate "due diligence"
where quite a lot of information is at least indirectly exchanged between the parties (Hansen
(2001), Boone and Mulherin (2009)). Thus it seems plausible that, during this stage, the
incumbent is able to estimate the synergy value of the potential acquirer quite precisely.
8
The bargaining game
At t = 1 the game starts starts with R submitting a rst unsolicited bid 1
to I for the acquisition of the target company and a negotiation process starts
between R and I to nd an agreement over the sale.
We model the bilateral takeover negotiation as an alternating-o¤er bargain-
ing game over T periods, with T even and nite, a variant of the Rubinstein-
Stähl innite alternating-o¤er game. We assume the negotiation has a nite
horizon for two main reasons: (i) an economic reason, that is all bargaining
surplus is likely to dissipate after a certain time preventing the negotiation from
going on forever; (ii) a strategic reason, that is a nite horizon model is strate-
gically non-stationary in the sense that late subgames are not equivalent to
those starting in earlier periods (Ma and Manove (1993), Muthoo (1999), Sloof
(2004)). Additionally, assuming a nite horizon is consistent with takeover prac-
tice and regulation in Europe. For instance in the UK, the recent amendments
to the Takeover Code have imposed a 28 day deadline on the "virtual bid", i.e.
the period during which the o¤eror has shown interest in the target without yet
committing to a rm o¤er (Takeover Panel Code Committee, 2011).12
R (I) makes an o¤er in all odd (even) periods. At each point in time, the
o¤er consists of a price per share to be eventually paid by R if the two parties
reach an agreement. We denote by t the price o¤ered by R in odd periods and
by t+1 the price asked by I in even periods. Upon receiving an o¤er at t, the
second player (i.e., the respondent) has three possible responces. He can either
(1). accept the o¤er (hereafter, this strategy will be denoted as fagreeg); (2)
reject the o¤er and delay the bargaining process to the next period, if t < T
(fstayg hereafter); or, (3) opt-out of the negotiation process. If the respondent
agrees to the proposed o¤er, the negotiation ends and R takes over the target
purchasing (at least) the block  of the target shares at the agreed bid.13 If the
target rejects the o¤er and delays, the raider can decide whether to stay in the
game and continue bargaining in the next period or to opt out of the negotiation.
Finally, if the target rejects the o¤er and opts out, then the bargaining process
ends. The dynamics and payo¤s of the respective opt-out options for R and I
are detailed in the next subsection.
Note that, being T even, R has the rst-move advantage whereas I has
the last-move advantage if the negotiation reaches period T . This is the only
asymmetry in the game, and it is motivated by the fact that the initial o¤er by
R is unsolicited.14 The last-move advantage consists of the respondent having a
restricted strategy space because, at T , the option to reject and delay is empty
and R can only either accept I 0s o¤er or opt out of the game.
12According to the new rules, implemented as of September 19, 2011, the 28 day deadline
is counted from the moment the o¤eror is named.
13R would equally pay the same price to any minority sharehold who decides to tender his
shares.
14Betton et al. (2009) similarly assume that the target management starts their takeover
game "accepting or rejecting an invitation by the initial bidder (B1) to negotiate a merger".
Aktas et al. (2011) show that in their sample more than 80% of the negotiated deals are
initiated by the bidder.
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Figure 1 illustrates the diagram of the decision nodes in periods t = 1; 2 and
T .
The outside option payo¤s and their dynamics
The main novelty of the model relative to the existing literature (e.g. Fish-
man (1988), Berkovitch and Khanna (1991), Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010)),
is represented by the dynamics of the opt out option. We endogenize this by
giving both players the possibility to call an auction at any stage if no agreement
has been reached. This allows us to provide new insights into the evolution and
the outcome of takeover processes and is consistent with Aktas et al. (2010)
and Betton et al. (2009), who consider models of merger negotiations under the
threat of an auction.
If at a certain stage t of the negotiation R decides to opt out, she initiates a
tender o¤er for 100% of the target shares upon the payment of some cost cto > 0
(hereafter we denote this strategy by fTOg).15 We model the tender o¤er as a
multi-stage ascending (English) auction, in which other potential bidders might
enter sequentially once the auction has started. (Engelbrecht-Wiggans (1988),
Berkovitch and Khanna (1991)). In order to streamline the analysis we consider
only one potential competitor, referred as B; but results are qualitatively equiv-
alent if we allow for two potential competitors to sequentially enter the auction
provided they are ex ante identical and their private valuations are i.i.d.16 Fi-
nally, we assume that if the competitor enters the tender o¤er, wins the auction
and takes over the target, I retains his private benets of control in the target
rm (or he is fully compensated for the loss of them). In other words, the second
bidder is a friendly competitor, a sort of white knight.
If at time t; I decides to opt out, he can call a private auction (fPAg
hereafter). This, however, requires him to pay some termination fees   0 to
R.17 ,18 As with tender o¤ers, we assume that there is a potential competitor B
who can subsequently enter the contest and compete against the raider.
15We assume that the opening bid in the tender o¤er is not constrained by the previous
o¤ers made to I during the private negotiation.
16Under these conditions, in fact, it can be shown that the bid that deters the entry of the
rst competitor would also deter the entry of others. Proofs of this result are available from
the authors upon request.
17Termination or inducement fees are often paid to the initial bidder if the target is ul-
timately acquired by another rm (Boone and Mulherin (2007)). We choose this way of
modelling termination fees because in our set up the nal takeover outcome is uncertain and
also because in equilibrium, whenever I opts out the raider R loses the contest (see the solution
in Section 4).
18 In the UK, Wippell and Knighton (2004) document that the most common practice is to
enter termination fee agreements (TFAs) when the bid is announced or immediately before-
hand, although it is not rare nowadays to observe TFAs entered at a much earlier stage. In
this paper we do not model how termination fees are set. They are usually the result of nego-
tiations between the two parties (see Rosenkranz (2005)) although the room for negotiation is
often limited by regulatory constraints. For instance in the UK, untill very recently termina-
tion fees were required to be de minimis and in any case no more than 1% of the target value.
The recent amendments to the Takeover Code have completely prohibited termination fees
- and other deal protection measures - on the grounds that "they might (i) deter competing
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Both in the case of a tender o¤er initiated by R or a private auction initiated
by I; at any time t the private valuation r is known to R and I but unknown
to B. The raiders initial bid t1 in any of these two contests is assumed to be
public. Before observing Rs initial bid, B has prior beliefs about the raiders
valuation dened by the uniform density function er  U [0; 1] which are updated
upon the observation of t1. The synergy es that B can generate by acquiring the
target is unknown to all participants when R proposes her rst bid t1 (Fishman,
(1988)).
The realization of es depends on the state of the bargaining game at time
t: Specically, let !t = f!l; !hg be the set of possible events occurring at each
t 2]1; T ]. For a given level of Rs private valuation r, if event !l occurs then es
is distributed according to a piece-wise linear distribution F (x):
F (x) = Pr(es  x) =
8<: [H0 + (1 H0)
x
r
] for x  r
+ (1  )
x  r
1  r
for x > r
(1)
Thus, at !l and for a given valuation r, the realization of es is lower (resp.
higher) than r with probability  (resp. 1  ), and there is a strictly positive
probability H0 that es = 0, while if es 2]r; 1] then es is uniformly distributed.
Notice that before a potential competitor B enters, both R and I know that
Pr(es  r) = , since they know the realized r.
If instead the state of the game is !h, then Pr(es > r) = 1, that is B can
overbid R with certainty.
The multi-stage auction evolves as follows. R submits a rst bid t1. Then
B, having observed t1, decides whether to pay a participation cost c > 0 to
learn both its synergy s and r and enter the competition. If B pays the cost c,
an ascending auction starts with R and B as contestants and the bidder with
the highest o¤er takes over the target paying the winning bid.
Figure 2 shows the structure of the multi-stage auction.
At !l the competitors decision to actually compete in the auction or not
depends on R0s initial o¤er t1 to the extent that 
t
1 contains information about
the valuation r. Hence in our model, similar to Fishman (1988), R can use her
initial bid to preempt the entry of potential competitor(s). Let U(r
t1 ) be the
updated c.d.f. of er conditional on the observed t1. The expected prot for B
upon observing t1 is equal to
B(
t
1) = EU(rjt1 )
[es  er] = Z 1
0

(1  )
Z 1
r
(s  r)dF (s)

dU(r
t1 ) (2)
The second bidder enters the auction only if B(
t
1) > c; otherwise he does not
compete.
o¤erors from making an o¤er [..], and (ii) lead to competing o¤erors making an o¤er on less
favorable terms than they would otherwise have done" (The Takeover Panel Code Committee,
2011). Our model is robust to the assumption of no termination fees.
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We now turn to the raiders and the incumbents opt out payo¤s at !l. When
they decide to opt-out, R and I know the true synergy level r but they do not
know the realization of es: Hence they conjecture that B enters the auction
with probability p 2 [0; 1]. Knowing that, with private, independent valua-
tions, English auctions are equivalent to second price auctions where the unique
weakly dominant strategy for both bidders is to bid their own valuation (Kr-
ishna (2010)), we can write Rs expected payo¤s (here net of the tender o¤er
costs cto) given his initial bid 
t
1 as
R(
t
1; r; !l) = p
(

"
H0
 
r   t1

+ (1 H0)
 Z t
1
0
(r   t1)dF (s) +
Z r
t
1
(r   s)dF (s)
!#)
+
+(1  p)(r   t1) (3)
where the rst term represents R0s expected prot if B enters the auction. In
that case, Pr(es  r) = . If s = 0 (what occurs with probability H0), then the
highest o¤er is 1t , while if s 2]0; r], the winning bid can be either 
t
1 (when
s 2]0; t1]) or s (when s 2]
t
1; r]). The second term denes Rs expected prot
if B does not compete, in which case R pays her initial bid t1.
Finally Is expected payo¤s from the opt out strategy when R with synergy
r initially o¤ers t1 is equal to:
I(
1
t ; r; !l) = p
(
(1 H0)
 Z t
1
0
t1dF (s) +
Z r
t
1
sdF (s)
!
+ (1  )

r + P

)
+(1 p)1t
(4)
If B enters the auction but R wins, then I receives a price equal to max

t1; s
	
.
If instead B wins the auction, then I receives a price r (R0s synergy) and also
keeps the control benet P=. Finally, if B does not enter the auction, R wins
the contest and pays the initial bid 1t .
In the rest of the analysis where applicable we simplify the notation as
follows:
R = R(
t
1; r; !l) (5)
I = I(
t
1; r; !l) (6)
with both expected payo¤s taken net of the tender o¤er cost and termination
fees.
The dynamics of the opt out payo¤s depend on the subsequent realizations
of the events !l and !h that dene the state of the game. Formally, at any
stage t, we dene the history of events as the sequence of all events
n
!jk
ot
j=1
,
!k = f!l; !hg that occur from stage one until stage t. At stage t; both R and I
know the history of events. If for any given t  T all past events
n
!jk
ot
j=1
are
equal to !l then the state of the game at time t is S
t = f!lg; otherwise, if the
history contains at least one event !h, then S
t = f!hg. Given the current state
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of the game, we assume that events evolve according to the following dynamics:
Pr(!t+1 = !l
St = f!lg ) = e  (7)
Pr(!t+1 = !h
St = f!lg ) = 1  e  (8)
Pr(!t+1 = !l
St = f!hg ) = 0 (9)
Pr(!t+1 = !h
St = f!hg ) = 1 (10)
In other words, if it becomes known that a bidder with higher valuation s > r
exists and is willing compete in the auction, (i.e. the current state is St = f!hg),
this holds true throughout the rest of the game. Intuitively, competitors stronger
than R do not leave the game. If at t there is uncertainty regarding the presence
of a competing bidder stronger than R, (i.e. the current state of the game is
St = f!lg), then the entry of such a bidder at each period is i.i.d. and follows a
negative exponential random process with intensity . Thus, if St = f!lg and
the bargaining process reaches period t+, the probability that a bidder with
valuation s > r appears in the time interval [t; t + ] is equal to 1   e  for
 = 1; 2; :::T   t. These dynamics capture the possibility that I nds a stronger
and more friendly acquirer while negotiating the terms of the merger with R.
Further, to make the analysis non trivial, we assume that S1 = f!lg.
The table below summarizes the payo¤s of R and I for any t and St from
opting out and calling an auction:
tR(!l; I fstayg; R fTOg) = R   cto 
t
R(!l;R fstayg; I fPAg) = R + 
tI(!l; I fstayg; R fTOg) = I 
t
I(!l;R fstayg; I fPAg) = I   
tR(!h; I fstayg; R fTOg) =  cto 
t
R(!h;R fstayg; I fPAg) = 
tI(!h; I fstayg; R fTOg) = r +
P

tI(!h;R fstayg; I fPAg) = r +
P

  
(11)
Payo¤s (11) include the direct cost of a tender o¤er cto and the termination fees
 . Also, notice that due to the stationarity of the dynamics (7)-(10), all the
opt-out payo¤s are constant over time.
4 The solution of the takeover negotiation
In this section we characterize the unique equilibrium of the bargaining game
described above and discuss its main properties.
As is standard in bargaining games (see e.g. Sloof (2004)), a necessary
condition to reach an agreement is that the joint opt-out payo¤s of the two
parties is lower than the total synergy generated by the deal. In what follows,
we check that this condition holds whenever necessary.
4.1 The characterization of outside options payments
Suppose that the bargaining game has reached state St = f!lg and either R or I
opt out: a multi-stage auction as described in Fig. 2 starts. The pure strategies
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in this auction are the following19 : Rs initial decision determines the rst bid in
the auction, t1, possibly depending on her valuation r. Bs strategy p species
the probability that he pays the entry cost c and then competes (p = 1) or
not (p = 0), conditional on the raiders initial o¤er t1. Let the conditional
density function U(er t1 ) denote Bs ex-post beliefs over the distribution of the
synergy er conditional on t1. B competes if his expected prot from entry (4)
outweighs the entry cost c. A Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) in the multi-
stage auction is such that (i) t1 maximizes (??) given the competitors decision
to enter or not; (ii) the entry decision p is rational in the sense explained above
given beliefs U(er t1 ) and (iii) U(er t1 ) is consistent with the initial distributioner  U [0; 1] upon observing t1.
Our multi-stage auction has a unique equilibrium whose structure is analo-
gous to that in Fishman (1988). Raiders with valuation r higher than a threshold
r 2 [0; 1] o¤er an initial preemptive bid 
t
1, denoted as  in the following, high
enough to signal that r  r where r is the minimum valuation that deters B from
competing in the auction. Formally, the threshold r is such that B(
t
1) = c
where U(er t1 ) is dened over the interval [r; 1]. On the contrary, raiders with
a lower synergy r < r o¤er t
1
= 0 which in turn signals r < r and triggers the
entry of B into the auction. Formally, given the threshold r, the preemptive bid
 then satises:
r     R(0; r; !l) for all r  r (12)
r    < R(0; r; !l) for all r < r (13)
The Proposition below provides a formal characterization of the equilibrium:
Proposition 1: Assume c < 1 4 , the game has reached state S
t = f!lg
and either I or R opt out. Then, for any t 2 [1; T ] there exists a unique Perfect
Bayesian equilibrium in the multi-stage auction such that:
(i) R with synergy r  r = 1 

4c
1 

makes an initial bid
 = r

1 

2
(1 +H0)

(14)
B0s ex post beliefs are such that r 2 [r; 1] and p = 0. The expected payo¤s of R
and I are equal to:
R(; r; !l) = r    (15)
I(; r; !l) =  (16)
(ii) R with synergy r < r o¤ers an initial bid  = 0, B0s ex post beliefs are
such that r 2 [0; r] and p = 1. The expected payo¤s of R and I are equal to:
R(0; r; !l) = r(1 +H0)

2
(17)
I(0; r; !l) = (1  )

r + P


+(1 H0)
r
2 (18)
19 In order to be able to do some comparative statics, we only focus on pure strategy equi-
libria.
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It is worth noticing that the payo¤s (15)-(16) and (17)-(18) are the expected
payo¤s of the two parties given that one of the them opts out. Once the auction
starts, raiders with low valuations, i.e. with r < r; cannot deter the entry of
potential competitors because they would be worse o¤ choosing a pre-emptive
bid since by construction r(1 +H0)

2 > r    for all r < r. This behaviour is
anticipated and incorporated to compute the agreement value in the negotiation.
In order to rule out uninteresting situations we need to impose the following
restrictions on the parameters cto and  :
Assumption 1 (A1): c < 1 4 and cto 2 [(1 )
P

  (1 H0)

2 r;
r
2 (1 +
H0)]
The restriction on the entry cost c derives from Proposition 1 whereas the
restriction on the tender o¤er cost cto is implied by the two following conditions:
(1) R(!l) + I(!l)  r + cto which we need to guarantee that an agreement
can be reached at some stage of the game and denes the lower bound of the
interval, and (2) R(!l) cto  0 which ensures that R
0s threat to go to tender
o¤er is credible and denes an upper bound on cto. In the following we will also
make use of following restrictions on the values of termination fees  :
Assumption 2 (A2):  < min
n
r   r
 
1  2 (1 +H0)

; 2 (1 +H0)r   (1  )
P

o
:
4.2 The characterization of the equilibrium by backward
induction
Because state St is known by both contestants at any stage t, we can characterize
the unique PBE of the bargaining game by backward induction. In order to
illustrate the equilibrium construction we rst describe the optimal strategies
for R and I in the last two stages T and T   1. We assume w.l.o.g. that,
whenever a player does not want to reach an agreement at a given stage he
(she) bids zero.
Because they will often be used in the rest of the analysis, we summarize the
multi-stage auction equilibrium payo¤s for R and I in state St = f!lg obtained
in Proposition 1 in the table below.20
St = f!lg r < r r  r
R r(1 +H0)

2 r   
I (1  )

r + P


+(1 H0)
r
2 
The next lemma characterizes the unique equilibrium in the last two periods
of the game T and T   1:
Lemma 1: Under A1 and A2, the unique equilibrium at stage T is a strategy
prole T = [T (!l);
T (!h)] such that:
20 In the analysis that follows, whenever R and I are written without specifying the range
of r, then results hold for all r (i.e. for r < r and r  r ).
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(i) If r  P

or if  < r < P

T =
8>>>><>>>>:
T (!l) =
(
TR(!l) = fagreeg
TI (!l) =
n
T (!l)
o
T (!h) =
(
TR(!h) = fagreeg
TI (!h) =
n
T (!h)
o
where T (!l) = r  (R  cto) and 
T = r. The continuation payo¤s for R and
I at the beginning of stage T are uniquely dened as:
ST = f!lg :

TR(r; !l;
T 1) = r   T (!l) = R   cto
TI (r; !l;
T 1) = T (!l) > I
(19)
ST = f!hg :

TR(r; !h;
T 1) = 0
TI (r; !h;
T 1) = r
(20)
The unique PBE at T   1 is T 1 = [T 1(!l);
T 1(!h)] such that:
T 1(!l) =
(
T 1R (!l) =
n
T 1(!l); TO
o
T 1I (!l) = fagreeg
T 1(!h) =

T 1R (!h) = f0; stayg
T 1I (!h) = fPAg
where the agreement is reached at o¤er T 1(!l) = I . The continuation pay-
o¤s for R and I at the beginning of stage T   1 are uniquely dened as:
ST 1 = f!lg :

T 1R (r; !l;
T 1) = r   T 1(!l) > R   cto
T 1I (r; !l;
T 1) = T 1(!l) = I
(21)
ST 1 = f!hg :

T 1R (r; !h;
T 1) = 
T 1I (r; !h;
T 1) = r + P

  
(22)
(ii) If r < P

and  2 [r; P

]; the unique equilibrium in ST = f!lg is the same
as in (i) while in ST = f!hg R simply exits the negotiations, and the continu-
ation payo¤s of R and I at the beginning of stage T are TR(r; !h;
T 1) = 0,
T 1I (r; !h;
T ) = P

.
The unique PBE at T   1 T 1 = [T 1(!l);
T 1(!h)] is such that:
T 1(!l) =
(
T 1R (!l) =
n
T 1(!l); TO
o
T 1I (!l) = fagreeg
T 1(!h) =

T 1R (!h) = f0; stayg
T 1I (!h) = fstayg
and the agreement is reached at o¤er T 1(!l) = I . The continuation payo¤s
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of R and I at the beginning of stage T   1 are uniquely dened as:
ST 1 = f!lg :

T 1R (r; !l;
T 1) = r   T 1(!l) > R   cto
T 1I (r; !l;
T 1) = T 1(!l) = I
ST 1 = f!hg :

T 1R (r; !h;
T 1) = 0
T 1I (r; !h;
T 1) = P

The characterization of the equilibrium in the last two stages of the game
suggests that in all states St = f!lg the value to each player of rejecting an
o¤er and staying in the negotiation varies across time. To prove this formally,
we need to determine the value of staying in the game and specify how this
changes over time.
Suppose the game is in St = f!lg with t < T   1 and that R expects I to
continue the negotation at t + 1 in the case of no agreement. Intuitively, R is
better o¤ at St+1 = f!lg than at S
t = f!lg. Indeed, as negotiation continues
into the next period the chances of a stronger competitor entering the contest
decrease. Thus the value of staying in the game for R, given that I does not
exit, should increase as the game approaches T   1. If this is the case, then
the strategy "stay" becomes more valuable to R as the game approaches T   1.
Conversely, conditional on R continuing the negotiation in the next period,
intuitively I is better o¤ at St = f!lg than at S
t+1 = f!lg, the reason being
that as the game approaches the end the chances of nding a strong competing
bidder decrease. Hence, the value to I of delaying the negotiations decreases as
the game approaches T   1:
These intuitions are formalized in the next Lemma.
Lemma 2: Let xt (resp. yt) be the expected continuation payo¤ of R (resp.
I) in St = f!lg given that no agreement is reached and no player opts out until
T   1 provided the state of the game remains is !l: Denote by   (T   1)  t
the number of periods elapsing from t until T   1.
(i) Under A1 and A2, if r > P

then for any t  T   1 we have:
xt(r) = e 

r   T 1(!l)

+ (1  e ) (23)
yt(r) = e T 1
T 1(!l) + (1  e
 )

r + P

  

(24)
where for any given r, xt decreases with  (i.e., increases with t) with a max-
imum in xT 1(r) = r   T 1(!l)  R   cto, while y
t increases with  (i.e.,
decreases with t) with a minimum at yT 1 = I = 
T 1(!l). Moreover:
xt + yt = r + (1  e )P

> r (25)
for any  > 0.
(ii) If instead r < P

and  2 [r; P

] :
xt(r) = e 

r   T 1(!l)

yt(r) = e T 1(!l) + (1  e
 )P
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where for any given r, xt increases (resp. yt decreases) with t if r T 1(!l) >
0 and xt + yt > r. Otherwise, if r   T 1(!l) < 0, x
t is decreasing in t and
negative.
Lemma 2 highlights a peculiar feature of our game. Contrary to other bar-
gaining models such as Rubinstein (1982) and Sloof (2004), where the value of
staying in the game is either constant over time or it decreases for both parties,
in our model this value increases for the raider while it decreases for the incum-
bent as the game approaches the end. The reason for this lies in the uncertainty
surrounding the entry of potential competitors at each stage which implies that
the value of the outside options is time-varying. This in turn allows us to obtain
a wider set of possible equilibrium outcomes.
Also, Lemma 2 characterizes Is credible threat in the case of no agreement.
Because yt decreases with t, but is always higher than I = 
T 1(!l), starting
a private auction is never a credible threat for I at any stage St = f!lg ;
t 2 [1; T   1] if R stays in the negotiation. Indeed, by opting out and starting
a private auction I would get a payo¤ I    that is always lower than y
t, the
payo¤ from continuing the negotiation when R also continues. I prefers to delay
the bargaining rather than opting out in state !l because, by so doing, he can
still hope to nd a stronger potential competitor to challenge the raider in the
case he decides to opt out at a later stage.
Conversely, the credibility of R0s outside option can change over time. In
fact, calling a tender o¤er at state St = f!lg is a credible threat only if x
t <
R   cto; whereas when x
t > R   cto; R is better o¤ staying in the game if I
stays in. Given that xt increases with t then either opting out is never a credible
threat or, if it is credible at some future state St
0
= f!lg t
0 < T   1, then it is
also credible at t = 1. Notice that this result does not hold when r < T 1(!l)
as in this case R is better o¤ exiting at t = 1 since the value of staying x1 < 0.21
Finally, Lemma 2 provides useful insights for the construction of the unique
PBE of the game at all states St = f!lg ; t 2 [1; T   2]. Specically, Lemma
2 implies that whenever xt + yt > r at any stage t < T   1 with St = f!lg
an agreement cannot be reached in equilibrium because opting out is not a
credible threat for either of the players. Hence the negotiation between R and
I continues as long as the state of the game remains !l.
Proposition 2: Let A1 and A2 be veried, r > P= and r > I . Suppose
the game starts at state S1 = f!lg. Then under A1 and A2 the unique PBE of
the bargaining game is characterized as follows:
(a1) If x1 = e (T 2) (r   I) + (1  e
 (T 2))  R   cto then R and I
sign an agreement immediately at S1 = f!lg with a bid
1 = I (26)
21This is also the case when termination fees are  > r  I(!l) =

2
(1 +H0)r  (1 )
P

as in this case R is better o¤ losing the multi-stage auction.
18
and the equilibrium expected payo¤s from the takeover contest are:
R(r; !l) = r   
1 > R   cto (27)
I(r; !l) = 
1 (28)
(a2) If x1 > R   cto and the state of the game stays at S
t = f!lg for
all t 2]1; T   1], then an agreement can be reached only in T   1 with an o¤er
T 1 (!l) = I .
If at some t  T   1 the state of the game switches to St = f!hg, then
(b1 ) If r > P=, the bargaining ends with a private auction won by a com-
peting bidder B. I pays the termination fees  to R and the equilibrium expected
payo¤s from the takeover contests are:
R(r; !l) = (1  e
 (T 1)) + (r   T 1 (!l))e
 (T 1) (29)
I(r; !l) =

r + P

  

(1  e (T 1)) + T 1 (!l) e
 (T 1) (30)
(b2) if r  P

and  2 [r; P

]; R leaves the negotiation and the equilibrium
expected payo¤s from the takeover contests are:
R(r; !l) = (r   
T 1 (!l))e
 (T 1)
I(r; !l) = 
T 1 (!l) e
 (T 1) + P

(1  e (T 1))
Interestingly, Proposition 2 shows that the takeover premium paid by R
equals Is expected payo¤ in case of an auction: in other terms, the wealth
e¤ect to the target shareholders is equal in auctions and in negotiations. The
reason is that in our model the resistance of the target in the negotiation is
endogenously determined by the degree of competition in a possible auction,
considered as the outside option. Notice that this result holds also for raiders
with high synergy r  r, who in case I threatens to launch an auction optimally
chose to pre-empt the entry of potential competitors by o¤ering a high bid .
Indeed, this possibility is rationally anticipated by R and I in the negotiation
and determines the premium in case of agreement.
Moreover, the premium is the same regardless of the period when the agree-
ment is reached, i.e. 1 = T 1(!l) = I whenever the outcome of the game is
a deal between the initial bidder and I.22 This shows that a long negotiation
does not necessarily favours the target shareholders when it is commonly known
that the time for reaching an agreement is limited. This is intuitive: as the end
approaches, the bargaining position of the initial bidder becomes stronger.
Case (a1) of Proposition 2 is the standard no-delay equilibrium typical of
Rubinstein-like bargaining games without uncertainty. Case (a2) of the propo-
sition however is specic to our setup. While the formal proof can be found
in the Appendix, we provide here an intuitive argument for this result. In any
state St = f!lg t < T   1; if R cannot credibly threaten to opt out from the
22At equilibrium I calls for an auction only in state S = f!hg i.e. only if a stronger
competitor B appears and then the takeover ends with B acquiring the target rm.
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negotiation, condition (25) implies that it is too expensive for her to seal an
agreement with I. This because in order to do so, R would need to o¤er I a
bid at least equal to his outside option payo¤ yt > I . In other words, a deal
would then leave R with a share of the pie equal to r   yt < xt, the value for
R to stay in the negotiation. However, when x1 > R   cto, R is better o¤
continuing the negotiation although by doing so she runs the risk of possibly
facing a stronger competitor and losing the contest in the future. This because
if the game reaches ST 1 = f!lg; R gets a payo¤ of r   I > R   cto that is
what R gets opting out to a tender o¤er immediately: at ST 1 = f!lg R earns
a surplus compared to what she gets going to a tender o¤er immediately. And
moreover, if the game switches to the state St1 = f!hg, at t1 2]t; T   1] then
R loses the auction but earns the breakup fees  . The termination fees then
work as an insurance for R against the possibility of losing the contest before
T   1, when R can earn a surplus: this explains why in (a2) R is better o¤
trying her chance and delaying the bargaining than closing the deal at r  yt or
going immediately to a tender o¤er getting R   cto.
5 Equilibrium properties and empirical implica-
tions
The characteristics of the equilibrium described in Proposition 2 allow us to
explain several features of the takeover negotiations documented in the empirical
literature as well as to deliver new interesting empirical predictions. Specically:
1. The takeover premium at which an agreement is reached is uniquely deter-
mined given Rs valuation of the target r and it equals the targets outside
option payo¤ from launching a private auction:
1 = I =  = r
 
1  2 (1 +H0)

if r  r
1 = I = (1  )

r + P


+(1 H0)
r
2 if r < r
The takeover premium in negotiated deals equals the premium in private
auction sales because the latter represents the "disagreement" payo¤ in
the bargaining and is then included in the terms of the deal. This result
may explain why the observed premiums in negotiated deals and private
auctions are not statistically di¤erent (Boone and Mulherin (2007)). Ad-
ditionally, the premium decreases with  and H0, both being measures of
potential competition.23 Thus our model is consistent with the ndings
of Aktas et al. (2010) that a takeover bid increases with the degree of
potential competition.24
23Recall that  is the probability that a potential competitor has a target valuation lower
than r, while H0 is the probability that potential competitors have zero synergy.
24Our result contrasts instead with Povel and Singh (2006) who do not nd that the premium
increases if the competitor is stronger. The reason for the di¤erent result is due to their
assumption that bidders are asymmetrically informed about the target value.
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2. In equilibrium, most of the deals are concluded in the rst round of ne-
gotiation: the two parties rationally anticipate the value of their credible
threats and reach an agreement immediately when this is possible. This
feature of our model is consistent with Betton and Eckbo (2008) which
shows that the median duration of contests when rms are private is zero
days. We also predict that the deals which are not concluded in the rst
period are signed at very late stages.
3. The results shed some light on the e¤ects of potential competition and
preemptive bidding versus target resistance on takeover outcomes. Con-
trary to Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2010) who nd that target resistance
is a key driver of takeover premium, we predict that preemption strongly
determines the takeover premium in takeovers initiated by high synergy
raiders. Conversely, in takeovers with low synergy raiders the premium is
highly dependent on the incumbent resistance.
4. The premium 1 is always lower than synergies r and es1, es2: thus our
model predicts that the acquirer always earns a positive return from the
deal, both in case it is reached by negotiations or by an auction. This is
consistent with Netter et al. (2011) that shows that acquisition activity
is wealth increasing for the shareholders of the acquiring rm.
5. Our model also provides testable implications about the impact of the
takeover length on the nal outcome suggesting that restraining the time
available to negotiate the deal plays in favor of the initial raider. The latter
has an incentive to delay the negotiation while reducing the chances for
the target of nding suitable competitors. Conversely, the higher T , the
(weakly) higher the expected prots for the target and the (weakly) lower
the expected prots for the initial bidder. As intuition suggests, allowing
for long negotiations helps the target since it gives him more time to nd
strong competitors. This has some relevant implications in the light of
the recent decision by the UK Takeover Panel to shorten the "virtual
bid" period to 28 days (The Takeover Panel Code Committee, 2011)25 .
Our result suggests that this might not be in the interest of the target as
expected by the Panel.
6. The takeover premium is the same irrespectively of the period when R and
I reach an agreement if the competitive environment does not change.26
7. For any given T , the higher , the lower x1, that is, the more likely that
a deal is agreed at t = 1. In other words, a high  lowers the value for
R to stay in the game, making Rs opt-out threat more credible; this
25 Indeed, coeteris paribus, the lower T , i.e., the shorter the period available for the negotia-
tion, the higher x1, i.e. the more likely the opt-out threat for the initial bidder is not credible,
and consequently the more likely the negotiation continues till the last period.
26 In our model we assumed that the set of potential competitors stay constant across time,
that is the characteristics of B in any given state !l of the game are the same irrespective of
the time t the game has reached.
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in turn facilitates the possibility of immediately signing an agreement.
Recall that  represents the probability for the target manager to nd a
strong competitive bidder at each given period of time. Thus,  can be
interpreted as a measure of the intensity of potential competition, which
in reality is likely to depend on the targets ownership structure as well as
the target managements personal connections, that determines its ability
to nd alternative competitors.
8. The following examines the e¤ects of the information costs c for the po-
tential entrants in the auction, the cost of launching a tender o¤er cto and
of termination fees  on the equilibrium outcome:
(a) The higher cto, the lower the opt-out payo¤ for R, hence the less
likely that his opting out is credible. This in turn makes it less likely
to observe an early agreement at t = 1.
(b) High c reduces the expected prots of potential competitors and this
in turn makes it easier for R to deter their entry. Also the threshold
r and hence the preemptive bid  are negatively correlated to the
auctions entry costs c.
(c) Su¢ciently low termination fees  do not increase the takeover pre-
mium so that they do not necessarily increase the ex-ante cost of a
deal for the initial bidder.
(d) Increasing  has a double e¤ect as it increases xt but it reduces yt:
it becomes then more di¢cult for the two parties to reach an early
agreement. As long as breakup fees are not too high, they compen-
sate the raider against the possibility of losing the contest without
however preventing the target from searching for a competitor. Hence
we suggest that su¢ciently low termination fees should not impair
competition in takeovers in contrast with the arguments proposed by
the Takeover Panel Committee in the UK which has recently banned
inducement fees (The Takeover Panel Code Committee, 2011).
9. In our model, tender o¤ers are never observed at equilibrium. However,
private auctions might arise, and they are more likely to be observed
when T is small,  (i.e. the intensity of potential competition) is low
and termination fees are (relatively) high: all these elements increase the
value for R to delay the agreement, in turn giving I time to nd stronger
competitors and organize an auction.This result is also consistent with
the observation of few public auctions (see also Aktas et al. (2010) and
Moeller et al. (2007) who report that less than 4% of the deals are subject
to observable public competition).
10. The possibility that the raider exits the game without submitting a second
o¤er27 arises when it is commonly known that a potential competitor with
27R always makes a rst bid that starts the whole process in our model.
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higher valuation has entered and would win a potential auction for the
target.28
6 Conclusions
The interest in the specic dynamics of takeover contests has grown recently.
Eckbo (2009, p. 3) points out that "in a very real sense, merger negotiations
occur in the shadow of an auction, so the expected auction outcome a¤ects the
bargaining power of the negotiation parties". And in the same line, Boone and
Mulherin (2007, p. 848) stress the importance of understanding the role of what
they dene the "complex private takeovers process (that) evolves prior to the
public announcement of a takeover bid" in order to draw conclusions on the
e¢ciency of the market for corporate control. In a recent paper, Aktas et al.
(2010) provide empirical evidence supporting the conjecture that many takeover
negotiations are in fact conducted under the threat of an auction. However,
despite the available empirical evidence, the theory lags behind in explaining
the dynamics of such takeover processes. Our paper represents a rst attempt
to shed light on how competition, both ex ante and ex post, a¤ects the evolution
of a takeover contest.
We build a bargaining model of alternating o¤ers adapted from the Rubinstein-
Stähl model that explicitly incorporates the possibility for each player to opt-out
at any stage of the negotiation and start an auction (also in the form of a ten-
der o¤er) that potentially involves a competing bidder. The model is able to
generate a number of interesting results about the "mode" of the takeover com-
pletion; that is, whether it concludes early or late with a negotiated deal or it
ends in a private auction or in a tender o¤er, as well as its most likely outcome
in terms of the premium.
The richness and exibility of the model allows us to analyze in details the
dynamics of the takeover negotiation and its equilibrium outcome depending on
several specic features of the takeover itself. More precisely, our model cap-
tures and accounts for numerous important dimensions of takeover contests in
practice, namely the cost of tender o¤er, termination fees, potential competition
and the length of the negotiation.
Our results provide a theoretical for rational for some puzzling empirical
facts such as: a. why takeover premia in negotiations do not di¤er signicantly
from premia in auction; b. why tender o¤ers are rarely observed in reality; and
c. why the duration of takeover negotiations is typically very short.
28This corresponds to what we dene as state !h in our model.
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8 Appendix (proofs)
Proof of Proposition 1: The characterization of the equilibrium is done in
two steps: (i) we determine the minimum threshold r such that for any r  r;
Bs expected prot from competing is nonpositive; formally, r is such that for
any r0 < r; B is not deterred from competing if he knew that r  r0 while he
would be deterred if he knew that r  r00, for all r00 > r; (ii) we compute the
minimum bid 
t
1, hereafter  for simplicity, that signals r  r assuming that
the best alternative to pre-emption of potential entrants is t1 = 0.
(i) To uniquely determine the minimum threshold r that deters B to par-
ticipate to the auction, we rst describe his entry choice. Suppose that upon
observing a rst bid , at equilibrium B updates the c.d.f. of er to U  x j  =
Pr(er  x j ) = x r1 r for r 2 [r; 1]. Also, when deciding whether to enter or
not, B does not know his valuation es, but he knows that, for any r, es > r with
probability 1   . Given that each bidders weakly dominant strategy in an
English auction is to bid up to its own valuation, B then expects a payo¤ equal
to (1 )
R 1
r
(s r)dF (s) upon entrance, since s is distributed according to F (s)
when s 2 [r; 1], with F (s) as in (1). Integrating this value for all possible types
r according to U
 
x j 

we obtain that the expected revenue of B from entry is
B() =
Z 1
r

(1  )
Z 1
r
(s  r)
1
1  r
ds

1
1  r
dr
B does not enter when B()  c that can be solved in r:
B() = (1  )
Z 1
r
1
1  r
Z 1
r
(s  r) ds

1
1  r
dr (31)
= 1 4 (1  r) = c
which denes the threshold equal to:
r  1 
4c
1  
(32)
with r 2 [0; 1] when c < (1 )4 . Given that B() is everywhere decreasing in
r 2 [0; 1], r is the minimum threshold that pre-empts competition.
(ii) Let us rst determine Rs expected prot o¤ering a rst bid t1 = 0. In
such case B enters with probability 1 (p = 1) and from (??) Rs expected prot
becomes
R(0; r; !l) = 

H0r + (1 H0)
Z r
0
(r   s)dF (s)

=
r
2
(1 +H0) (33)
linear in r 2 [0; 1]: This guarantees that the single-crossing conditions formalized
by equations (12) and (13) are satised.
27
Given the threshold r we can now characterize the minimum bid that deters
Bs entry by requiring that the expected prot of raider with synergy r o¤ering
a zero initial bid, given by (33), be (weakly) lower than Rs prot from pre-
empting Bs entry i.e. r   . Solving
r
2
(1 +H0)  r   
in  we nd that
 = r

1  (1 +H0)

2

=

1 
4c
1  

1  (1 +H0)

2

(34)
by substitution of (32).
As in Fishman (1988), the uniqueness of this equilibrium can be proved
applying the credibility requirement of Grossman and Perry (1986).
In order to complete our proof we are left to nd I 0s expected payo¤ when
t1 = 0 which from (4) is equal to:
I(0; r) = (1 H0)
Z r
0
sdF (s)

+ (1  )

r + P


= (1  )

r + P


+ (1 H0)
r
2 (35)
Finally, we have that
I(0; r) + R(0; r) = (1  )

r + P


+ (1 H0)
r
2
+
r
2
(1 +H0)
= (1  )

r + P


+r > r

In the following, whenever R and I are written without specifying the
range of r, then results hold for any r r  r and r  r (respectively the case
with pre-emption and without pre-emption).
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose the game reaches the last stage T and ST =
f!lg. R can credibly threaten to opt-out by launching a tender o¤er and ob-
taining R   cto > 0 by Assumption 1. Thus, in order to obtain an agreement
with R, I cannot claim more than r (R cto). An agreement can be signed at
bid T (!l) = r  (R cto) and, given that R+I  r+cto under Assumption
1, I is also better o¤ obtaining T (!l) than opting out and getting I .
29
29 Indeed, we have:
T (!l) = r   (R   cto) > I
R + I   cto < r
cto > r   (R + I)
that is true by Assumption 1.
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The only credible threat for R at state ST = f!hg is to exit without launch-
ing a tender o¤er, getting a payo¤ equal to zero. If R exits at ST = f!hg, then
I keeps the control of the target rm and the private benets P=. If r > P=
an agreement is possible at any bid T (!h) such that:
P

 T (!h)  r
so that I asks for a minimum bid T (!h) = r to R who agrees to sign the deal at
this o¤er. If otherwise r < P=, R simply exits and I keeps the private benets
P=. In any case R obtains a payo¤ of zero, while the payo¤ for I is equal to
max fr; P=g.
Going backward we get to the analysis of the bargaining stage T   1 given
the continuation payo¤s. Let us start with ST 1 = f!hg. Given (10), players
know that their continuation payo¤s are equal to (20) when r > P=. Thus, if
R is called to play at the last node of stage T   1, then she will choose to stay
in the game30 ; anticipating this decision, at the previous node I prefers to call
a private auction, because in this way he obtains a payo¤ r+P=   > r when
 < P=. Hence, given that I 0s threat to go to a private auction is credible, an
agreement is not protable for R because it would require o¤ering I more than
r. Consequently, the unique equilibrium at ST 1 = f!hg is:
T 1R (!h) = f0; stayg
T 1I (!h) = fPAg
and the equilibrium payo¤s are equal to (22).
In the case r < P= instead, R knows the best she can obtain from the
negotiation is zero, so she can leave the negotiation without calling for a tender
o¤er. Anticipating this, I can call a private auction obtaining r + P=    .
If I rejects and delays the deal, the game moves to ST = f!hg where I gets
P=. With r < P=, we have that r + P=    < P= with  > r. Thus at
equilibrium, with r < P= and  2 [r; P=] no deal can be reached and R exits
with zero, while I keeps the private benets P=. With r < P= and  < r we
have at ST 1 = f!hg the same equilibrium as in the case r > P=.
If the game is in ST 1 = f!lg, when R is called to play, she has two options:
to opt out, launching a tender o¤er and obtaining R cto > 0; or to stay in the
negotiation. In this latter case her expected payo¤ is equal to e (R   cto) <
R   cto by (7) and (8). Thus, R goes to the tender o¤er. Anticipating this
decision, the credible threat for I at ST 1 = f!lg is the following: I can call
a private auction at his turn before R obtaining a payo¤ I    ; or he can
reject the o¤er and delay ending up with I , since I rationally anticipates that
R chooses a tender o¤er. In order to obtain an agreement, R then has to o¤er
at least T 1(!l) = I to I. Under Assumption 1, R prefers to secure a deal
rather than to launch a tender o¤er, because r T 1(!l) = r I  R  cto.
30Opting out, R gets  cto, while ending he gets zero for sure.
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The unique equilibrium at ST 1 = f!lg is then:
T 1R (!l) =
n
T 1(!l); TO
o
T 1I (!l) = fagreeg
which in turn dene the equilibrium payo¤s at the beginning of stage T   1 as
stated in the lemma. 
Proof of Lemma 2: (i) r > P= or r < P= and  < r.
At ST 1 = f!lg Lemma 1 shows that R can credibly threaten to opt out if I
rejects R0s o¤er and stays into the negotiation, because e (R cto) < R cto.
Recall that xt is the expected payo¤ for R in any state St = f!lg, t < T   1,
given that the game proceeds to stage t+ 1 (that is, if no agreement is reached
and no player opts out at St = f!lg). Let us start studying the case r > P=:
when t = T   2, we have:
xT 2 = e 

r   T 1(!l)

+ (1  e )
Therefore if no deal is signed at T   2 and the game proceeds to stage T   1,
then the continuation payo¤s for R are given by (21) and (22). With an abuse
of notation let xT 1 = r  T 1(!l).
31 Assuming that no agreement is reached
and no player opts out before ST 1 = f!lg as long as the state of the game
stays at !l, we can repeat the same argument for any S
t = f!lg, t 2 [1; T   1],
obtaining:
xt 1 = e xt + (1  e
 )
Solving recursively the above equation, where for clarity we replace the time to
the end (T   1)  t with variable ; we have:
xt = e 

r   T 1(!l)

+ (1  e ) (36)
If r   T 1(!l) >  (36) implies that x
t increases with t. Viceversa, if r  
T 1(!l) <  , x
t is decreasing in t. We now need to distinguish two cases (a)
r  r and (b) r < r. The condition r   T 1(!l) >  leads to the following
restrictions on the value of  in the two cases:
(a) r   T 1(!l) = r    >  ,  < r   r

1  (1 +H0)

2

; and
(b) r T 1(!l) = r I >  , r 

(1  )

r + P


+(1 H0)
r
2

> 
which is equivalent to:
 <  (1 +H0)
r
2   (1  )
P

Summarizing, if r > P= and x(T 1)  = e 

r   T 1(!l)

+ (1  
e ) , xt is increasing in t only if termination fees are su¢ciently low, i.e.
31 It is commonly known that at the last stage an agreement is certainly reached at ST 1 =
f!lg: hence, the game does not continue at S
T 1 = f!lg.
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 < min
n
r   r
 
1  (1 +H0)

2

;  (1 +H0)
r
2   (1  )
P

o
which determines
our assumption (A2).
Notice also that at  = 0 (i.e. at t = T   1) then xT 1 = r   I > R   cto
by Lemma 1 irrespective of the value of the synergy r:
Similarly, recall that yt is I 0s expected payo¤ in state St = f!lg when the
game proceeds to stage t + 1 (i.e. no agreement is reached and no player opts
out at St = f!lg). By Lemma 1, at S
T 1 = f!lg a deal is signed at equilibrium
at the o¤er T 1(!l) = I . If no deal is signed at T   2 and r > P= then
the continuation payo¤s for I at T   1 are given by (21) and (22) and we can
write:32
yT 2 = e T 1(!l) + (1  e
 )

r + P

  

As before, assuming that (i) no agreement is reached at any stage t < T   1;
no player opts out before ST 1 = f!lg ; and (ii) that the state of the game
stays at !l, the argument can be repeated backward for any S
t = f!lg with
t 2 [1; T   1]. We then obtain:
yt 1 = e yt + (1  e )

r + P

  

Solving this recursive equation:
yt = e T 1(!l) + (1  e
 )

r + P

  

(37)
and yt decreases with t reaching a minimum at yT 1 = T 1(!l) if r+
P

   >
T 1(!l). If we are in case (a) where r  r and 
T 1(!l) = ; then the condition
r+ P

   >  is trivially satised under the conditions on  determined above.
The same holds if we are in case (b) where r < r and T 1(!l) = I as in this
case it must be r + P

   > I which again is guaranteed by (A2).
(ii) r < P

and  2 [r; P

].
Lemma 1 shows that R obtains a zero payo¤ in f!hg, hence x
(T 1)  =
e 

r   T 1(!l)

, which is increasing in t i¤ r   T 1(!l) > 0 i.e.
(a) r  r : r   T 1(!l) = r    > 0
(b) r < r : r   T 1(!l) = r   I > 0
which are both veried by (A2) as r  
1
>   0 and r  I >   0. Is
continuation payo¤ at T   1 is equal to P

by Lemma 1 and
y(T 1)  = e T 1(!l) + (1  e
 )P

which is decreasing in t i¤ P

  T 1(!l) > 0. Again distinguishing the two
cases:
32Again, yT 1 = bT 1(!l) with an abuse of notation because the game ends at T   1 at
equilibrium.
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(a) r  r : T 1(!l) =  and
P

   > 0 since  < r < P

;
(b) r < r : T 1(!l) = I and
P

 I > 0 i¤ 
P

 r

(1  ) + (1 H0)

2

>
0 which is true for su¢ciently low r.

Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of the proposition makes use of the
following lemma.
Lemma 3: Let t < T   2 be an odd number so that R makes the rst
o¤er, and assume that A1 and A2 are veried, r > P= and r > I . Then the
unique PBE of the game in state St = f!lg is to reach an agreement at o¤er
t(!l) = I if either x
t+1 < R   cto or x
t < R   cto < x
t+1. Otherwise,
if R   cto < x
t < xt+1 then, for any odd t < T   2, at St = f!lg the game
continues to stage t+ 1.
Proof of Lemma 3: Consider the case when xt+1 < R   cto and let t be
an odd number. At state St+1 = f!lg I starts making an o¤er and, because
xt+1 < R  cto, R can credibly threaten to opt-out at t+1. So, for R to accept
any o¤er by I; I must match at least R0s opt-out payo¤ R   cto. At such an
o¤er, R agrees and leaves I with a payo¤ r   (R   cto) > I the payment I
would get when R opts out. Hence, at equilibrium an agreement is reached at
t+ 1 with the following continuation payo¤s:
t+1R (!l) = R   cto
t+1I (!l) = r   (R   cto) > I
We use the previous result to analyze what happens at stage t, when R starts
making an o¤er. By Lemma 2 we have xt < xt+1 < R   cto, hence opting-out
is also a credible threat for R at St = f!lg. Because of that, R can induce I
to accept an agreement payo¤ I . I rationally anticipates this and accepts any
o¤er t(!l)  I , with this condition holding as an equality at the equilibrium.
Consider now the case xt < R   cto < x
t+1. We start again by analyzing
the equilibrium at St+1 = f!lg, when I makes an o¤er. By Lemma 2, if I is
called to play at the last node of this stage, I always prefers to stay rather than
to opt out because yt+1 > I , 8t. Knowing this, Rs payo¤ from rejecting the
o¤er and delaying is equal to xt+1 > R   cto; hence R does not opt-out at
t + 1. To induce R to agree, I has to o¤er R at least xt+1, and in such a case
the payo¤ for I would be at most r   xt+1. By Lemma 2, yt+1 > r   xt+1 that
implies that, if St+1 = f!lg; then I prefers to continue the negotiations rather
than to reach an agreement with R: Thus, at St = f!lg both players know
that at state St+1 = f!lg there will not be an agreement at equilibrium when
xt+1 > R   cto.
Let us now move backward to St = f!lg. Given that there is no deal at
equilibrium at St+1 = f!lg, x
t represents the continuation payo¤ for R to stay
in the game if the last node of stage t is reached, and because xt < R   cto,
R opts out at this point. Anticipating this, I prefers to reject and delay any
unsatisfying o¤er rather than to opt out thereby avoiding to pay the termination
fees  . Thus, in order to induce I to agree, R must o¤er at least t(!l) = I
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that leaves R with a payo¤ at most equal to r   I : Any o¤er lower than I
would induce I to stay in the negotiation without an agreement, and this would
in turn induce R to opt-out because xt < R   cto. In conclusion, if a deal is
not agreed, then, by Assumption 1, R gets at most R   cto < r   I . Hence,
R is better o¤ o¤ering t(!l) = I and signing a deal with I: This outcome is
supported by the fact that Rs opt-out threat is credible.
The last case is R   cto < x
t < xt+1: Suppose that at St = f!lg; R makes
the rst o¤er. By the previous argument, there is no deal at equilibrium at
t + 1, so when the last decision node of stage t that belongs to R is reached,
then R prefers to stay in the game because opting out is not a credible threat
(xt > R   cto). Anticipating this, I
0s continuation payo¤ is given by yt > I ;
hence, opting out is not a credible threat for I either. Thus, when making the
rst o¤er, R knows that I will sign a deal only at an o¤er at least equal to
t(!l) = y
t. But by doing so, R obtains a payo¤ smaller (or equal) than r  yt:
thus R cannot credibly threaten to opt out at the last node of stage t, and,
so, her outside option payment is xt. But by Lemma 2, (25): x
t + yt > r ,
r   yt < xt. Hence for R it is always optimal not to propose an agreement
and stay in the negotiation. I plays the same strategy so at equilibrium the
negotiation proceeds to stage t+ 1. 
To conclude the proof of Proposition 1, note the following. By Lemma 1,
opting out is a credible threat for R at T   1: indeed, by Assumption 1, R0s
payo¤ R at ST 1(!l) = r   
T 1(!l) = r   I > R   cto. More generally by
Lemma 3 we have that opting out is a credible threat as soon as xt < R cto or
xt+1 < R   cto, and, when one of these two inequalities holds a deal is signed
at bid equal to I . Thus, if an (odd) t < T   1 s.t. x
t+1 < R  cto exists, then
there will be a unique equilibrium where a deal is signed at bid t(!l) = I .
But if this is the case, then, by Lemma 2, also xt < xt+1 < R   cto, hence
an agreement is signed in the previous stage t (odd, so R makes the rst o¤er).
This proves the rst part of the Proposition.
Because xt is increasing with t under the stated assumptions (see Lemma 2),
when x1 > R  cto the R
0s opt-out threat is never credible until T  1 provided
the game stays in state !l. Thus the game continues as long as the state is !l
until stage T   1, when an agreement is signed at T 1(!l) = I (Lemma 1).
Further, to compute the players expected payo¤s when x1 > R  cto notice
that with r > P

, R (resp. I) earns  (resp. r+ P

  ) as soon as the game falls
into state !h, while R (I) earns R   cto (resp. I) if S
T 1 = f!lg, an event
with probability e (T 1). Thus R obtains
(1 e )
0@T 1X
j=0
e j
1A+(R cto)e (T 1) = (1 e )1  e (T 1)
1  e 
+(R cto)e
 (T 1)
which provides the expression in the text of the proposition. Analogous proce-
dure gives the expected payo¤ for I. The expressions for the expected payo¤s
in case r < P

are obtained analogously considering the equilibrium actions of
R and I at !h described in Lemma 1. 
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